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THE CASE FOR CREATING A SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COURT SYSTEM-A FURTHER COMMENT
SCOTr C. WHImEY*
Section 9 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 directs
the President of the Umted States through the Attorney General to
study the feasibility of an environmental court or court system.' Respon-
sibility for conducting this "investigation and study" was assigned to a
Justice Department Task Force composed primarily of staff attorneys
from the Land and Natural Resources Division. Under the terms of
section 9, the findings and recommendations of the Task Force were
to be submitted to Congress by October 18, 1973.
On April 27, 1973, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice
announced that that Division "has tentatively taken a position recom-
mending against the establishment of an environmental court." 3 This
announcement aligns with the generally negative views expressed by
* A.B., Umversity of Nevada; J.D., Harvard Umversity. Professor of Law, The
College of William and Mary; Counsel to Bechhoefer, Snapp, Sharlitt & Trippe,
Washington, D.C.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). Section 9 provides: "The President, acting
through the Attorney General, shall make a full and complete investigation and study
of the feasibility of establishing a separate court or court system, having jurisdiction
over environmental matters and shall report the results of such investigation and study
together with his recommendations to Congress not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this Act."
2. The Environmental Court Task Force was created by the Deputy Attorney
General to carry out the congressional assignment. The preponderance in the Task
Force of staff attorneys from the Land and Natural Resources Division of the De-
partment of Justice arose because that Division has responsibility "for the conduct of
most of what is commonly understood to be environmental litigation," that is, criminal
and civil actions against private citizens who violate environmental control laws, and
the defense of federal officials accused of conducting governmental programs in vio-
lation of environmental statutes, especially the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. Kiechel, Enznromnertal Court Vel Non, 3 E.L.R. 50013 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Kiechel].
3. Id. at 50015. It is instructive to note that the Task Force investigation was not
even one-half complete when the tentative statement of position was announced. 3
E.L.R. 10058 (1973). The statement, however, made clear that the position taken
therein was the preliminary conclusion of the Land and Natural Resources Division
and did not necessarily represent the final view of the Department of Justice.
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several commentators as to the feasibility and desirability of a special el-
vironmental court system.4
Subsequent to enactment of section 9, this author presented considera-
tions suggesting that a special. environmental court system is feasible and
desirable, perhaps even necessary 5 In view of the tentative recommenda-
tion of the Task Force against establishment of an environmental court,
and because of the need for a complete and objective discussion of the
issue, this Article will consider the validity of the arguments cited by
the Task Force in support of its tentative conclusion.6 Initially, how-
ever, it is important to examine the manner in which the Task Force
structured its investigation.
The information presently available indicates that the Task Force
made certain threshold assumptions with respect to two basic questions:
the jurisdictional limits of an environmental court, and the manner in
which such a court would be structured. With respect to jurisdiction,
the Task Force posited that "whatever limits might be placed upon its
jurisdiction, an environmental court should have exclusive jurisdiction
of the subject matter falling within those limits. That is, a plaintiff
should not have a choice of forums." 7 Moreover, it was assumed that the
court "would have jurisdiction to resolve or review all related non-
environmental legal issues." 8 Finally, the Task Force assumed that ulti-
mate review would rest with the Supreme Court upon certiorari, that
the environmental court would be created as a constitutional rather than
a legislative court, and that "the scope of judicial review of agency
action would remain unchanged from that now available." 9 Apart from
the vagueness of the last statement, these assumptions are unexception-
able.
As to the organization of an environmental court, the Task Force
formulated three "model" courts which, in its view, encompassed the
major structural alternatives. Under the first alternative, the structure
4. Oakes, Developments in Envrromnental Law, 3 E.L.R. 50001, 50011-12 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Oakes]; Thompson, Courts and Water, The Role of the Judicial
Process, in NATIONAL WATER COMMISSoN STUDY (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thomp-
son].
5. Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Envronmzental Court System, 14 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 473 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Whitney].
6. The views of the commentators cited m note 4 supra will be considered in con-
nection with the discussion of the views of the Task Force. These commentators raise
few matters of importance not considered by the Task Force.
7. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50013.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 50014.
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of the court would be similar to that of the Court.of Claims, with com-
missioners or trial judges handling trial matters on an individual basis and
with a panel of judges sitting as an appellate division. Consonant with
the Task Force's basic assumptions, the court would have exclusive juris-
diction over all environmental cases. The second structural alternative
formulated by the Task Force was a court composed of a panel of judges
whose sole function would be to review federal administrative orders
affecting the environment. This court also would have exclusive juris-
diction. The final alternative was a somewhat truncated version of
the second alternative "model," consisting of a panel of judges having
exclusive jurisdiction to review orders by certain designated federal
administrative agencies or special environmental matters handled by
federal agencies.' ° A major difficulty in analyzing these "structural" as-
sumptions is that the precise wording of the alternatives is not now
publicly available for study; consequently, as will be seen, interpreta-
tional problems may be difficult to resolve.
The structural alternatives were circulated, together with a question-
naire," to an unspecified number of "federal agencies and nongovern-
mental organizations including Bar associations known or believed to
have an interest in environmental problems." 12 The declared intent of
the Task Force was to canvass organizations representing "a broad
spectrum of viewpoints on environmental matters." 13 Responses were
received from 26 undisclosed federal agencies and nine unidentified
private organizations, and comments on the .stinuctural alternatives were
supplied by various unspecified divisions within the Department of Jus-
tice.14 The consensus of the responses was characterized as "near un-
10. Id.
11. The questionnaire solicited the following information: (1) The respondent's
total litigation experience in terms of new cases since January 1, 1970; (2) The per-
centage of such cases having significant environmental issues; (3) The percentage of
cases having minor or tangential environmental issues; (4) The respondent's opinion
of the ability of courts generally to handle techmcal environmental issues; (5) Pref-




14. Id. at 50015. Neither the precise wording of the description of the three alterna-
tive "models," the questionnaire, nor the responses -thereto by the various agencies
and .private orgamzations were available for public study at the time thls Article was
written. (An .oral request by this author to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General on
June 10, 1973, seeking access to these materials was declined.) Accordingly, total reliance
was placed on the summary characterization of these inqumes and responses set forth
by the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in Kiechel, supra- note 2.
1973] \ ]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
anmity among federal agencies and environmental organizations alike
m the strong opposition to the establishment of a separate environmental
court." 18
Without any intent to cavil at the assumptions and methodology em-
ployed by the Task Force, two observations appear warranted. First,
the report summarizing the Task Force's tentative position evidences a
preconceived lack of sympathy with the study mandated by Congress:
The [Congressional] Committee apparently assumed that there
is a clearly distinguishable body of "environmental matters" before
the courts. In any event, Congress did not attempt to define "en-
vironmental matters." Had it done so, the problems to which I
shall refer should have been substantially reduced. Or, perhaps,
an environmental court would never have been suggested.1"
Second, it appears that the structural alternatives as formulated by
the Task Force gave rise to misunderstanding among the respondents.
For example, one respondent reportedly objected to an environmental
court because of fear that such a tribunal would be less accessible to
would-be litigants than the federal district courts.17 It would appear
from this response that the questionnaire did not permit consideration of
the possibility of an environmental court system having a decentralized
structure at the trial level and thus that all major available alternatives
were not deployed m the questionnaire.
In light of the unavailability at this time of the exact questions and the
precise descriptions of the alternative "models" submitted to the various
agencies and private groups, it is impossible to evaluate reliably the re-
15. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015.
16. Id. at 50013. That the Task Force has announced its opposition to environmental
courts, be that position tentative or not, prior to reaching the half-way point in its
investigation and study should also be considered in evaluating the objectivity of the
undertaking. See note 3 supra.
17. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015. Similarly Judge Oakes, who appears to have
had access to the text of the Task Force alternatives, clearly assumes that the pro-
posed environmental court would be centralized in Washington, D. C.. "[it is best
to continue to allow environmental cases to be tried locally, rather than to channel
them into a centralized place as, for example, are Court of Claims cases which are all
heard in Washington." Oakes, supra note 4, at 50012. In fact, the Court of Claims does
hear cases outside the District of Columbia. For example, "Trials for the purpose of
taking testimony and receiving exhibits are conducted before the commissioners of the
court who serve as its trial judges, and the trials are conducted at locations most
convenient for the claimant and his witnesses." UITm STATEs GovaRNMqrr ORGANI-
ZATIoN MANUAL 61 (1972-73).
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sponses thereto. However, the tentative statement of position does set
forth the four basic arguments relied upon by the Task Force in support
of its tentative recommendation against creation of special environ-
mental courts. The merits of these objections can be assessed inde-
pendently of any critique of Task Force methods.'8 Congress presum-
ably will hold hearings after receipt of the Task Force study and the
presidential recommendations, at which time further evidence from
sources other than those consulted by the Task Force presumably will
be considered. It would, however, be rmsleading during the interim to
leave unrebutted the Task Force's assumption that there are "no identi-
fiable proponents of an environmental court." 19 Accordingly, the re-
mainder of this Article will evaluate the four factors which the Task
Force asserts support its tentative position.
I. There Is an Identifiable Body of Environmental Cases for Purposes
of Establislng the Jurisdiction of an Environmental Court.
The Task Force does not appear to have invested any extensive
effort in formulating criteria to identify environmental litigation which
would be subject to the jurisdiction of an environmental court. At the
outset, the Task Force noted that "little is known of the thought
processes behind [section 9]," and that "Congress did not attempt to
define 'environmental matters.' "20 That the Task Force itself apparently
did not attempt to define "environmental matters" at any point in its
questionnaire is evident from its statement that the "initial response to
our request was a rapid succession of inquiries as to how we defined
'environmental cases' ", 21 Such a reaction is understandable, since
responsible prospective respondents naturally would desire to provide
meaningful data, and because the term "environmental matters" is no
doubt susceptible to more than one definition. However, the Task
Force appears to have concluded that requests for clarification of the
questionnaire indicated that the term "environmental matters" is not
susceptible of any rational definition, conceding that it had "to ac-
knowledge frankly that [it] had no definitions going beyond the mean-
18. Congress presumably can gain access to the basic Task Force documents to
determine whether objective and accurate methods were employed to canvas agency
and other opinion, whether an adequately broad cross-section of opinion was con-
sulted, and what weight should be given to the Task Force's summary of responses.
19. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015.
20. Id. at 50013.
21. Id. at 50014.
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rngs which the terms themselves suggested." 22 Embracing tls rather
solipsist view, the Task Force, without further effort to devise a defim-
nion,21 summarily concluded that this alleged indefinability constitutes
"a fundamental obstacle to the creation of an environmental court." 24
In support of this argument, it cited the Alaska pipeline case,25 M wich
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held, on nonenvironmental grounds, that the Secretary of the Interior
lacked authority to approve construction of the proposed pipeline.
The definitional difficulty encountered by the Task Force raises the
question whether it is valid to conclude that the mixture in certain cases
of environmental and nonenvironmental issues precludes the formula-
non of criteria which define environmental matters for jurisdictional
purposes. As will be explained subsequently in detail, the fact that a
given case embraces "mixed" issues presents no insuperable obstacle to
identification of environmental jurisdiction. Indeed, "pure" cases, that
is, cases presenting only straightforward issues arising under a single
statute or controlled exclusively by the doctrine of a single area of law,
are infrequent, even in the so-called specialized courts. Litigation fre-
quently involves a multiplicity of issues implicating various types of
legal questions, yet this mix has never been supposed to preclude the
selection of a court with proper jurisdiction.
The United States Court of Claims is cited by the Task Force as an
example of a special court which, unlike an environmental court system,
has readily distinguishable special jurisdiction which can ordinarily be
ascertained from the allegations of a complaint. The Task Force notes
that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction where "the plaintiff is seeking
money damages from the United States based upon the Constitution, an
act of Congress or administrative regulation or a contractual obliga-
22. id.
23. Interestingly, Judge Oakes, who also opposes creation of special environmental
courts, appears to have no difficulty m defimng the prospective jurisdiction of such
courts. He does, however, point out that environmental law is "diffuse" "It comes,
among other things, from international law, constitutional law, administrative law,
public health law, nuisance law, natural resources and property law, conservation law,
and a myriad of statutes, federal and state." Oakes, supra note 4, at 50001. Judge Oakes
notes that because "environmental law, unlike Customs law, Court of Claims work, or
Tax Court cases, is a sort of hodgepodge of international law, administrative law, tort,
procedure, statutory construction etc. ., [ilt is crucial that judges who are passing
upon environmental cases have more than a nodding acquaintance with these other
legal areas." Id. at 50011.
24. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50014.
25. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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non. ") 26 Although it cannot be gamsaid that all cases reaching the
Court of Claims are grounded on the Constitution, a federal statute, an
adminstrative ruling, or a contractual obligation, to infer that all Court
of Clais cases are "pure" single-issue cases is to ignore the multifarious
matters which reach that court. Cases heard in the Court of Claims
include Indian claims, refund of federal income and excise taxes, cer-
tan patent matters, back pay and retirement questions by civilian and
military personnel, and implied contracts not sounding in tort.27
It is true, as Judge Oakes has noted, 2 that environmental law embraces
a number of legal disciplines. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that judges
on such specialized courts as the Court of Claims or the Tax Court also
must have more than a "nodding acquaintance" with other fields of law,
such as contracts, negotiable instruments, real and personal property,
trusts, corporations, and legal accounting. There is simply no valid basis
for assuming that environmental courts would be staffed by judges not
competent to cope either with so-called "mixed" cases or with concepts
derived from other branches of the law Indeed, it is conceivable that
Congress might decide to alleviate the present workload problem in the
federal district courts by authorizing, depending upon local need, one
or more new judges for each federal judicial district to hear all en-
vironmental cases and all "mixed" cases involving important environ-
mental issues. Although such judges would be recruited on the basis of
merit from the members of the practicmg bar and academic ranks in the
same manner as federal district court judges presently are selected, they
would specialize in environmental litigation,2 and appeals from their
decisions would proceed to a single environmental appellate court.30
As noted earlier, the Alaska pipeline case, despite widely recogmzed
environmental implications, was decided on the basis of nonenvironment-
al grounds. It does not follow, however, that such a case should be
excluded from the jurisdiction of an environmental court. Mixed cases
involving both environmental and nonenvironmental issues will no doubt
continue to be prevalent. Why the presence of nonenvironmental issues
in a case involving one or more significant environmental issues should
preclude determination of the case by an environmental court has never
26. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50014.
27. Umn'a STATES GovmamENT ORGANIZA-ON MANUAL 60 (1972-73).
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See notes 42-60 mfra & accompanying text.
30. See notes 87-89 rnfra & accompanying text.
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been explained.3 Apparently, opponents of an environmental court
system assume that judges in such courts would be competent only as
to environmental matters and thus incompetent to handle "mixed" cases.
However, as previously noted, there is no basis in the history of existing
specialized courts to support such an assumption; furthermore, nothing
in the nature of the options available to Congress precludes creation of
environmental courts fully capable of handling such "mixed" cases.
Just as there is a common identifying thread permeating the diverse
litigation before the Court of Claims, there similarly is a common thread
permeating environmental litigation. The environmental aspect in most
cases involving "mixed" issues generally may be discerned from the al-
legations of a competently drafted complaint. Cases arising under the
provisions of statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),32 the Clean Air Act,3 3 the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act,34 the Noise Control Act,8 5 the Resource Recovery Act,36 the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act,3 7 and the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act 8 are readily identifiable as environmental litigation. In the
case of citizens' suits commenced pursuant to federal environmental stat-
utes providing for them,3 9 the environmental aspect similarly is apparent.
It is submitted that it would be no more difficult to identify cases
appropriate for adjudication in an environmental court than it is to
determine which agency actions constitute major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment and thus
31. That the case may be decided on a nonenvironmental ground, or even a pro-
cedural ground, is not necessarily relevant to the question of jurisdiction. The crucial
issue is one of prudent allocation of judicial workload. See notes 61-gi infra & ac-
companying text.
32. 72 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
34. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 96 Stat. 1234 (1972).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59 (1970).
37. 7 U.S.C.A. § 135 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973).
38. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972).
39. The so-called "federal common law" of the environment is another readily
identifiable line of environmental cases. See Washington v. General Motors Corp.,
406 U.S. 109 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Romero v.
Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Texas
v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1971); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968).
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within the purview of NEPA. To be sure, a significant number of
NEPA cases have involved disputes as to the applicability of that Act,
but such cases have been clearly environmental in nature and readily
recognizable as such.
Environmental litigation also may arise in the context of statutes
which involve environmental matters only indirectly Thus, for ex-
ample, federal highway legislation requires that federal parklands be
used for the construction of highways only if no feasible or prudent
alternative routing exists. 40 The environmental aspect of cases arising
under such a statute would be readily identifiable for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Moreover, since virtually all projects involving federal decision-
making, whether affecting national forests, grazing rights, or mineral ex-
traction on public lands, would constitute a major federal action sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, litigation
relating to such projects would involve the impact statement require-
ments of NEPA, and the question of jurisdiction of an environmental
court would be easily resolved.
The purported threshold difficulty encountered by the Task Force of
identifying environmental cases for the purpose of formulating juris-
dictional limitations would appear to be more a matter of disinclination
than any intrinsic inability to conceive workable methods of identifica-
tion of environmental jurisdiction. The success of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality and, indeed,
the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice41
in delineating their respective jurisdictions without difficulty indicates
that identification of environmental issues is not so troublesome as the
Task Force would have it appear.
II. Special Expertise Is, Desirable and Necessary m Deciding Environ-
mental Cases.
Opponents of special environmental courts. challenge the need for
specialized judicial expertise in adjudicating environmental cases. In
discussing this question, the Task Force reports two somewhat conflict-
ing positions expressed by respondents to the questionnaire. The opm-
ions of a number of respondents were summarized as follows:
The supposition that an environment9i':6urt would be better
equipped to understand complex environmental legal issues and
40. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
41. See note 2 supra.
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to evaluate technological data was given little credence. The dis-
trict courts, it was pointed out, are accustomed to complex issues
of law and to evaluating the testimony of experts in fields with
which the judges are not familiar. There is nothing unique in
the legal or technological complexity of environmental cases. Al-
though not always satisfied with the results in particular cases,
responding agencies saw no difference in the ability of present
courts to deal with the complexities of environmental cases and
their ability to handle other complex cases.42
This view is supported by Justice Douglas' dissent in Ohio v. Wyan-
dotte Cbemcals Corp.,43 in which he took issue with the majority view
that the Supreme Court lacks the necessary expertise to adjudicate en-
vironmental cases: "The practice has been to appoint a Special Master
which we certainly would do in this case. We could also appoint-or
authorize the Special Master to retam-a panel of scientific advisers. The
problems in this case are simple compared with those in the water cases
discussed above. The problem, though clothed in chemical secre-
cies, can be exposed by the experts." 44
Elsewhere, the Task Force reports the somewhat contradictory view
advanced by some respondents oppos'mg the creation of an environ-
mental court that the "broad range of issues involved in environ-
mental litigation would defy the acquisition of 'expertise in en-
vironmental matters." 45 Other critics of a specialized environmental
court have argued that judges with a more generalized legal background
can, in fact, do a better job than a specialist concentrating on the minutiae
of a technical field of law-
In our society, courts are called upon to be generalists. A dis-
trict court judge may one day decide a technical patent claim in-
volving chemical bonds and the next day hear a railroad negligence
claim requiring understanding of the ordinary duties of a switch-
man according to union rules. Many commentators feel that this
broad scope of the courts is an essential protection to both parties,
since it assures that a neutral outsider whose only specialty is mak-
ing decisions will bring precedent and common sense to bear on
a wide variety of problems. 46
42. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015.
43. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
44. Id. at 511-12.
45. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015.
46. Thompson, supra note 4, at 9.
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Aqpther statement of this pysition has been supplied by Judge Oakes:
IT] he current system of review by generalist judges already al-
lows for the consideration of the best technical expertise m the
various areas of environmental concern. The adversary system,
with introduction of expert testimony and careful cross-examina-
tion, allows for pretty careful examnmation of the most advanced
technical knowledge about the costs of a given polluting activity
and the alternatives to that activity 47
It also has been maintained, somewhat surprisingly, that technical ex-
pertise in environmental matters is not really necessary at all, since, it
is argued, environmental litigation does not raise "techical" issues
requiring mastery of the substantive scientific disciplines involved, but
only issues necessitating the "weighing of public policy considera-
tions?' as Advocates of this view cite a NEPA case and a non-NEPA
environmental decision in support of their thesis.
The NEPA decision was Envtronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers,4 in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin further construc-
tion on the Gillham dam project unless and until the Corps of Engineers
prepared an environmental impact statement in compliance with the
provisions of NEPA. Although granting the injunction, the federal dis-
trict court implied that the responsibility for considering matters per-
tdiiing to the environmental impact of the project would rest with the
Corps and not the reviewing court. The non-NEPA decision, Cittzens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,0 involved the scope of judicial
review under federal statutes providing that the Secretary of Trans-
portation cannot authorize construction of interstate highways through
parkl-and unless "there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use
of such land." rl The Supreme-Court held that a reviewing court must
simply determine whether the Secretary, in authorizing the construc-
tibn -in question, had conformed to the stated intent of Congress. This
d&ermination could be made "without any need whatsoever in educating
47. Oakes, supra note 4, at 50012. Judge Oalkes also expresses the belief that the
"wisdom and overview which comes from dealing with [environmental litigation]
in non-environmental contexts will, I believe, lead to the development of a sounder
and.more consistent body of.environmental law." .Id. at 50011.
48. Thompson,-supra -note 4, at 45.
49. 325 F Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
50. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
51. 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (1970); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
1:9-7:3-
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the Court in highway engineering. In fact, that expertise would have
been beside the point." 52
The argument that environmental litigation does not require special-
ized judicial knowledge is opposed by statements of numerous courts
proclaiming their lack of expertise to adjudicate technical environ-
mental questions. For example, in Wyandotte Chemicals the Supreme
Court refused to exercise original jurisdiction it admittedly possessed
over a water pollution controversy, stating:
The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a
most competent Special Master, might appropriately undertake at
this time to unravel these complexities is, to say the least, unreal-
istic.
[T]his Court has found even the simplest sort of interstate
pollution case an extremely awkward vehicle to manage. And this
case is an extraordinarily complex one both because of the novel
scientific issues of fact inherent in it and the multiplicity of gov-
ernmental agencies already involved. We have no claim to such
expertise or reason to believe that, were we to adjudicate this case,
and others like it, we would not have to reduce drastically our at-
tention to those controversies for which this Court is a proper and
necessary forum.53
Cases involving the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would,
of course, embroil the Court in the task of trying the facts in contro-
versy, a function in no way different from the normal trial responsibility
of federal district courts. Morever, there is no basis to assume that
federal district court judges would be any more competent within their
existing workload constraints to adjudicate complex and technical ques-
tions than the members of the Supreme Court. It is apparent that a key
factor motivating the Supreme Court to decline to assume what it
characterized as "noisome, vexatious, or unfamiliar tasks" 14 was their
heavy workload. As will be demonstrated,5 5 the same consideration is
applicable to the federal district courts.
52. Thompson, supra note 4, at 50.
53. 401 U.S. at 504-5 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court has subsequently
declined to exercise its original jurisdiction in other pollution cases. See, e.g., Washing-
ton v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
US. 91 (1972).
54. 401 U.S. at 499.
55. See notes 61-81 infra & accompanying text.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently
grappled with the problem of expertise. In International Harvester Co.
v. Ruckelsbaus,56 the court reviewed the validity of the decision of the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency denying a pe-
tition filed by various automobile manufacturers, pursuant to section 202
of the Clean Air Act, for a one-year suspension of the 1975 emission
standards for light duty veucles. The question whether effective tech-
nology was available to achieve compliance with the 1975 standards in-
volved complex and multifarious technical and scientific questions. The
National Academy of Science (a statutory party), the Environmental
Protection Agency, and expert witnesses for the manufacturers sub-
itted extensive scientific data to the court for consideration. Judge
Leventhal, writing for the court, observed:
It is with utmost diffidence that we approach our assignment
to review the Administrator's decision on "available technology"
The legal issues are intermeshed vwtb technical matters, and as yet
judges have no scientific aides. Our diffidence is rooted in the
underlying technical complexities, and remains even 'vhen 've take
into account that ours is a judicial review, and not a techmcal or
policy redetermintion, our review is channeled by a salutary re-
straint, and deference to the expertise of an agency that provides
reasoned analysis. Nevertheless we must proceed to the task of
judicial review assigned by Congress.57
After canvassing m detail a wide range of highly technical questions,
the court remanded the Administrator's decision for further hearings.
In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in the result
reached by the majority, but commented:
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one
does not know I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I rec-
ognize that I do not know enough about dynamometer extrapola-
tions, detenoration factor adjustments, and the like to decide
whether or not the government's approach to these matters was
statistically valid. Therein lies my disagreement with the majority
The court's opinion today centers on a substantive evaluation of
the administrator's assumptions and methodology I do not have
56. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 641 (emphasis supplied).
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the technical know-how to agree or disagree with that evaluation-
at least on the basis of the present record.5s
Thus, four basic views have been expressed with respect to the need
for, and importance of, special environmental expertise:
(1) The view expressed by the majority of the Supreme Court in
Wyandotte Chemicals and Chief Judge Bazelon in International
Harvester that environmental litigation does involve technical
expertise that is beyond the "competence" of generalist courts
and judges;
(2) The view elicited by the Task Force from the responses to its
questionnaire that environmental litigation is no more complex
than many other areas presently handled by regular federal
courts; the corollary to this view is that generalist judges would
do a better job than specialists in adjudicating environmental
litigation;
(3) The view expressed by Thompson that special expertise is not
at all necessary in environmental litigation since such cases are
not decided on the basis of substantive technical data, but rather
on broad public policy grounds;
(4) The view reported by the Task Force that the range of technical
issues involved in environmental litigation is so vast that no court
could be expected to acquire expertise in environmental matters.
It is manifest that these divergent viewpoints derive primarily from
different conceptions of the meaning of "environmental expertise." The
concept of "expertise" is best understood by examining the historic
evolution of the two connotations most frequently associated with the
term: the expertise which is the raison d'etre of the administrative agen-
cies, and that which is associated with specialized courts.
58. Id. at 650 (emphasis supplied). Section 307(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (b) (1) (1970), provides for direct review of decisions of the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency concerning national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standards, any emission standard under section 112, any
standard of performance under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other
than a standard to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under
section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, or any standard
under section 231.
The decision in International Harvester, notwithstanding Chief Judge Bazelon's
strictures, indicates that in such statutory situations courts will, despite their "dif-
fidence" to do so, inquire deeply into disputed questions of techmcal fact.
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Administrative expertise normally develops as a body of experience
and special knowledge about a given regulatory area over which the
agency exercises quasi-legislative and executive power as well as quasi-
judicial authority These administrative situations arose not only by
virtue of the inadequacy of judicial remedies but also because of the
judiciary's inability to provide the necessary continuing surveillance of
a broad range of human activity For example, as James Landis has
noted, the creation of an administrative agency to supervise the issuance
and trading of securities was prompted by the lack of protection af-
forded the investor by judicially administered rules of law- "As in the
case of the Interstate Commerce Commssion, it was not long before it
became evident that the mere proscription of abuses was insufficient to
effect the realization of the broad objectives that lay behind the movel
ment for securities legislation. The primary emphasis of administrative
activity had to center upon the guidance and supervision of the industry
as a whole." 51
Because the missions assigned to administrative agencies by their or-
gamc statutory mandates generally are directed toward the regulation
of a single industry or the accomplishment of specific objectives, the
agencies have acquired a body of special knowledge called "expertise."
This agency expertise, which is simply an accretion of experience de-
rived from handling a wide range of practical, problems, many of
which are not judicial in nature, is not the type of special knowledge
needed by an environmental court. Moreover, it is not necessary that
environmental courts be staffed by judges who are career chemists,
physicists, accoustical experts, biologists, nuclear scientists, or specialists
in other scientific fields. Environmental courts, or judges specializing in
environmental litigation, might well, however, make extensive use of
special masters who are well versed in various relevant technical dis-
ciplines.
The second connotation frequently associated with "expertise" re-
fers to the knowledge of special courts such as the Tax Court. Mr.
Justice Jackson has aptly described the Tax Court and the nature of the
"expertise" involved in its work as follows:
It deals with a subject that is ughly specialized and so complex
as to be the despair of judges. It is relatively better staffed for its
59. LANDIs, THE ADmiNsTRATVm PRocmss 15 (1938). Landis notes that the "domnant
theme in the administrative structure is thus determined not primarily by political
conceptualism but rather by concern for an industry whose econormc health has
become a responsibility of government." Id. at 12.
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task than is the judiciary Its members not infrequently bring to
their task long legislative or administrative experience in their sub-
ject. The volume of tax matters flowing through the Tax Court
keeps its members abreast of changing statutes, regulations, and
Bureau practices, informed as to the background of controversies
and aware of the impact of their decisions on both Treasury and
taxpayer.6o
Thus, unlike administrative agency expertise, the expertise of such a
specialized court is focused narrowly on litigation, as distinguished from
the continuing comprehensive regulatory, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legis-
lative missions of agencies. Like Tax Court adjudication, which presup-
poses an in-depth familiarity with an extensive body of special statutory
provisions and voluminous regulations, environmental adjudication pre-
supposes detailed familiarity with numerous special statutes and a rapidly
growing body of specialized regulations emanating from agencies such
as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environ-
mental Quality
The argument here advanced is not that any given federal judge or
court, be it the Supreme Court or a federal district court, is not capable,
given "world enough and time," to develop a mastery of these matters.
Rather, the question is essentially one of staffing, workload, and efficient
judicial allocation of functions. Thus, just as it has been determined
that it is judicially more efficient and productive to provide courts to
preside over such special fields as taxation, customs, patents, and claims
against the government, it also would be prudent and efficient to provide
a special adjudicative apparatus for environmental litigation.
Like other special fields of the law, environmental matters involve
highly specialized and intricate questions which could be adjudicated
more efficiently by courts with expertise acquired from continual ap-
plication of environmental statutes and regulations to technically complex
issues. As will be shown in the following section, although existing
federal courts can intellectually grasp the subject matter, given enough
time and effort, to continue to burden general courts with the increasing
volume of complex and technical environmental cases would interfere
with existing priorities and aggravate the pressures of overcrowded
dockets. At both the trial and appellate levels, courts presently lack the
time which a special court could devote to developing the detailed fa-
miliarity with the numerous statutes, voluminous regulations, and tech-
60. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1943)
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mcal subject matter which is prerequisite to prompt and efficient de-
cision of environmental questions.
III. Existing and Forecast Federal Judicial Workloads Would Be Sub-
stantially Relieved by Specialized Adjudication of Environmental Cases.
The Task Force has asserted that the "total number of environmental
cases is not now sufficient, and it cannot presently be predicted that it
will ever become sufficient, to justify the creation of a separate court
system." 61 This conclusion is based upon a statistical computation which
purportedly demonstrates that environmental cases constitute "less than
seven tenths of one percent of the total case load" of the federal district
courts and the courts of appeal.62
A threshold difficulty with this computation is that the Task Force
does not disclose the method it used in calculating the number of
pending environmental cases. One of the paradoxes of the Task Force
study is that although announcing m one section that environmental cases
are unidentifiable, it states in another section, with an apparent attempt at
precision, that 860 pending environmental cases can be "identified."
Apart from this apparent contradiction, such statistical computations
can be misleading even if the basic numbers used in the computation are
accurate. Assuming arguendo that the correct number of environmental
cases pending in the courts is 860, the fact remains that this is more
than double the workload presently pending before the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals. 63
It would, of course, be possible, though not particularly meaningful,
to compare the number of cases pending before the special courts with
the total federal judicial workload. It is unlikely, however, that any
61. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50016.
62. The Task Force noted:
Our study also indicated that, although environmental litigation has had
a dramatic impact upon the government and upon society generally, it
has not had a very significant impact upon the total case load of the fed-
eral courts. As of June 30, 1972, there were 101,032 civil cases and 25,438
criminal cases pending in the United States district courts. In addition,
there were 9,939 cases pending in the courts of appeals. At the same time,
there were approximately 860 cases pending before those courts wich
could be identified as environmental. These constituted, then, less than
seven tenths of one per cent of the total case load.
Id. at 50015.
63. As of June 30, 1972, there were only 398 cases pending before the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. 1972 ANNuAL REPORT oF Tam DIRFeroR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATiVE OFFIcE OF THm UmTran STATES 422-23.
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serious student of the federal judiciary would argue that special courts
are not necessary or useul because they account for only a small per-
centage of the total number of cases in the federal courts.
It is significant to note that the Task Force report assumes that "it
cannot be predicted that [environmental litigation] will ever become
sufficient to justify the creation of a separate court system." 64 This
unsupported prediction conflicts with the views of experienced judges.
Judge Wright, for example, has asserted that current environmental
cases represent "only the beginning of what promises to be a flood of
new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our
natural environment." 65 Similarly, Judge Femberg has stated that the pe-
culiarly broad and general terms of NEPA invite interpretational
disputes that proliferate litigation.66
Of further significance is that environmental reform still is in its
infancy Two major additional environmental statutes dealing with
strip-mining 7 and land use planning6" are likely to be enacted during
the present session of Congress; numerous other environmental proposals
are pending before that body The President in a recent energy mes-
sage 9 to the Congress has requested, inter alia, legislation dealing with
deep water ports, unified national research and development capa-
bility, and power plant and refinery siting, as well as creation of a De-
partment of Natural Resources and Energy In light of the increased
environmental litigation certain to result from the enactment of these
and other reforms and planning proposals, there appears to be no rational
basis for the conclusion of the Task Force that there would never be suf-
ficient environmental cases to justify creation of a special environ-
mental court.
In evaluating the demands placed upon judicial resources by environ-
mental litigation, examination of the complexity of issues presented by
such cases is perhaps more relevant than an analysis of bare statistics.
The proper resolution of environmental issues often involves the ap-
plication of a vast new body of statutes and regulations to complex
64. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50016.
65. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
66. Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Feinberg emphasized
that NEPA is "a statute whose meaning is more uncertain than most, not merely
because it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of its phrasing."
,67. S.425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
68. S. 269, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
69. Statement of the President on Energy, June 29, 1973.
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theoretical and factual situations. Every federal agency has promulgated
detailed and voluminous regulations establishing adimistrativq proced-
ures bringing that agency's decisibnmaking into compliance with the
mandates of NEPA. In addition, the Environmental Protection: Agency
almost daily publishes new guidelines, standards, and regulations dealing
with the vast scope of matters within its jurisdiction. Similarly, the
Council on Environmental Quality periodically issues detailed guide-
lines for environmental compliance. In short, there is a vast, growing,
and ever-changing corpus of environmental regulations that must be
mastered by judges charged with the responsibility of adjudicating en-
vironmental matters.
Furthermore, every agency of the federal government must prepare
and publish environmental impact statements in connection with every
major decision significantly affecting the human environment. Such
statements are routinely voluminous and complex, and their legal suf-
ficiency is frequently challenged by environmentalists in the courts. In
view of the ever-expanding role of the federal government in environ-
mental reform and planning, it appears certain that the volume of regu-
lations and impact statements will continue to grow, with a concomitant
increase in litigation construing or evaluating such promulgations. 71
The present workload crisis of the federal courts is too well known
to require extensive documentation. 71 Suffice it to say that the work-
load of the Supreme Court has trebled in the past 20 years and the
workload of the courts of appeals has more than trebled in the past 10
years. 2 The federal district courts experienced a 13 percent increase
in caseload from 1969 to 1970, "the steepest caseload jump for any year
in the last decade." 73 A total of 125,324 civil and criminal actions were
commenced in 1970, compared to 87,421 in 1960.74 The case backlog at
all levels has increased seriously, inevitably prolonging the lead time in
reaching decisions.
Projections of future demands on the federal judiciary are even more
alarming According to Senate Judiciary Committee forecasts, a miri-
70. As noted earlier, the parallel between contemporary environmental law and the
.Complexity of federal tax law is striking. See note 60 supra & accompanying text. If
anything, environmental law embraces an even broader and more comprehensive body
of techmcal regulations and standards.
71. Whitney, supra note 5, at 482-86.
72. Id.
73. REPoRT oF nm Commnir= ON =in JuDictmY, S. REP. No. 92-134, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1971).
74. Id, at 29, 37
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mum of 1,129 federal district judges and 273 circuit judges will be
necessary to handle anticipated caseloads by 1990. 75 Assuming adherence
to the accepted standard of nine judges per circuit, it appears inevitable
that as many as 30 circuits will be required by 1990.76 Furthermore, be-
cause of a greater potential for mter-circuit conflict, substantial additional
burdens will be placed upon the Supreme Court. In view of these indis-
putable conditions, it seems clear that some special provision for hand-
ling the large and growing volume of environmental litigation is re-
quired.
It is important to reiterate that the number of pending or forecast
environmental cases is only one factor to be considered in evaluating the
impact of such litigation upon the federal judiciary Environmental
cases tax judicial resources by raising complex and novel issues requiring
familiarity with voluminous technical regulations and statutes. They
thus consume significantly more judicial time per case than most other
types of actions. For example, although Sierra Club v. Morton" has
been before the courts since June 1969, it has yet to be resolved on the
merits. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC7 required
more than seven years to adjudicate, and Wilderness Society v. Morton7 9
involving the Alaska pipeline issue, consumed some three years before
the delay became intolerable and special legislative intercession became
necessary to break the judicial log-jam. 0 It is obvious from these and
other examples that delay in adjudication of environmental matters con-
sistendy exceeds that experienced with general federal litigation.-'
75. Whitney, supra note 5, at 485.
76. Id.
77. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
79. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-153 (Nov. 16, 1973). Interestingly, as noted in the Task Force
report, at the point Congress interceded, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had not yet addressed itself to the NEPA issues. The Task Force report notes
that "it is pure conjecture to try to guess what an environmental court would have done
with the pipeline case. But it is reasonable to suppose that, by this time, that is, within
three years, an environmental court would have decided the environmental issues."
Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50014.
81. In the federal district courts, as of June 30, 1970, over 52,000 cases had been
disposed of within one year, 21,012 cases had required between one and two years,
9,613 cases had required between two and three years, and 8,004 cases, or only eight
percent of the total, had been pending three years or longer. REPORT OF THE CoM-
mfrlrm oN THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 92-134, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 29, 37 (1971).
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In evaluating the Task Force study, Congress should consider care-
fully the sigmficant extent to which a special environmental court sys-
tem could contribute to relieving the workload crisis in the federal
courts. As the foregoing evidence indicates, the existing federal court
system is ill suited to the efficient and expeditious disposition of complex
environmental litigation, especially in light of forecasted future de-
mands upon judicial resources.
IV Environmental Courts Can Be Structured to Possess Adequate "In-
stutional Strength" and' Can Resolve Serious Substantive Conflicts
Whhic Have Arisen in Various Circuit Courts.
The Task Force report asserts:
There is virtually no evidence of support for a separate environ-
mental court among those most directly affected by the manner in
wluch environmental controversies are handled. Experience sug-
gests that a court lacking active support from any of the influen-
tial interests to be affected by its operations does not have a bright
future.8 2
Elsewhere, the report notes that various respondents to its question-
naire expressed "fear that an environmental court would lack institutional
strength to withstand the pressures likely to be focused upon it by
special interest groups." "I Similar misgivings about the institutional
strength of special environmental courts have been expressed by Judge
Oakes:
[I]t is quite possible that the appointment of Environmental
Court judges would be much more subject to influence by lobby
than are appointments of district or court of appeals judges. This
is true simply because those whose aims are not supportive of en-
vironmental protection would be likely to concentrate their very
substantial resources on influencing the appointments to these spe-
cialized positions. 84
82. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50016.
83. id. at 50015.
84. Oakes, supra note 4, at 50012. The same pessimistic assumptions could have
been made with respect to establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency or,
for that matter, the Tax Court, which frequently adjudicates cases involving large
and influential corporations and monetary liability comparable to the stakes at issue
in environmental litigation.
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It is, of course, possible to postulate a priori that any proposed institu-
non will be weak and venal. Absent any corroborative evidence, how-
ever, such speculation is unpersuasive. Moreover, in the case of an
environmental court, there are several constraints which indicate such
pessimistic assumptions are without basis. Since one of the postulates
of the Task Force study is that "the court would be created as a con-
stitutional, rather than a legislative court," 85 all of the existing civil and
criminal laws and regulations and the canons of ethics that assure proper
conduct by federal judges and parties participating in litigation before
existing federal courts would apply in an environmental court.
Furthermore, judges designated to handle environmental litigation
can be selected in the same manner as judges in existing federal courts.
Such appointments are subject to confirmation by Congress, a body
which repeatedly has demonstrated its disposition to enact effective en-
vironmental reform legislation regardless of the impact on powerful
interest groups. In addition, Congress has on occasion refused to confirm
appointments, especially those to quasi-judicial agencies, when there is
evidence that a prospective appointee might be unduly industry ori-
ented.8" There is thus no basis to assume that even if the President ap-
pointed judges with backgrounds suggesting a possible bias against
environmental reform, Congress would confirm them. Finally, in light
of the high quality of appointments to top positions in agencies
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, there is no indication that the President would not continue
to appoint candidates possessing the highest order of competence, in-
tegrity, and objectivity
In an abundance of caution, Congress may well see fit to assure both
institutional strength and high integrity by creating special judicial
machinery as an adjunct to existing federal district courts to try en-
vironmental litigation. A special panel of the trial level judges could
85. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50014.
86. Recently the Senate by a 49 to 44 vote rejected President Nixon's nomination
of Robert H. Morris to serve on the Federal Power Commission. Mr. Morris is an
attorney who had represented Standard Oil Co. at one time and also represented cer-
tam natural gas interests before the FPC. Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D. Wash.),
chairman of the Commerce Committee, commented: "[Tihe Senate again is asked to
accept for an independent regulatory agency with vast powers over an industry which
affects vital national interests, yet one more nominee whose professional career has
been dedicated to the furtherance of the private interests of that industry" 5 NATIONAL
JouSRNAL REPoars 925 (1973).
[Vol. 15 33
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
constitute a single environmental court of appeals to review environ-
mental decisions. Implementation of such a system would remove the
serious threat to the credibility and effectiveness of adjudication of en-
vironmental cases presently resulting from conflicts among circuits on
interpretation of NEPA.87 Such conflicts not only significantly ob-
struct uniform and consistent enforcement of important environmental
laws, but also render compliance by the many important affected in-
dustries more difficult. As a result, such industries have incurred stg-
nificant unnecessary economic costs. 8s Moreover, uncertainties regard-
ing statutory requirements have resulted in delays in bringing on-line
many industrial activities required by the public interest.
Certainty, or at least predictability, in environmental law would en-
hance appreciably industry's ability to plan complex and costly facilities,
some of which require a decade's lead tume to complete. This certainty
in the environmental area is at least as important to the orderly growth
of an industrialized, populous society as is certainty in the area of tax
law 89 Faced as it is with the need greatly to expand industrial capacity
to keep pace with public demand and to assure attainment of the high
standard of living that is one of the society's stated goals, the Umted
'States can ill afford a "trial and error" jurisprudence that unnecessarily
renders environmental planning unpredictable and costly It is submitted-
that uncertainty as to the substance of environmental legal requirements,
not the possibility of excessive industry-oriented pressures, is the major
present threat to the institutional strength of federal courts adjudicating
-environmental cases.
The so-called "energy crisis" is only the first of a series of resource
crises this nation will experience unless the present large and growing
body of environmental constraints on productivity are skillfully, prompt-
ly, and consistently articulated. Thus, in evaluating the final conclusions
of the Task Force on the need for creation of a special environmental
-court, Congress should give careful attention to the importance of achiev-
87. wumey, supra note 5, at 486-501.
88. It is not a little disquieting to learn that at least one judge appears to approve
of inter-circuit conflicts. Judge Oakes notes: "Although the Supreme Court may
eventually bring into line conflicting doctrine in the different circuits and states,
there is a healthy cross-fertilization which occurs from having different courts rule
on given environmental questions and then living with those decisions for a time."
Oakes, supra note 4, at 50011 (emphasis supplied).
89. The long experience with conflicting circuit court decisions on tax questions
has been universally criticized as one of the chief defects of the United States Tax
Court. Whutney, supra note 5, at 486-88.
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ing uniformity and consistency in adjudication of environmental ques-
tions. It is manifest that the present judicial system fails to produce the
requisite uniformity and consistency It is equally clear that a special
environmental adjudicatory system such as that here discussed would
produce uniformity and consistency as well as other significant ad-
vantages, not the least of which would be noticeable workload relief
at all levels of the federal court system.
A final matter reported by the Task Force deserving comment is the
"concern over the possibility that creation of an environmental court
would lead to additional specialized courts and the fragmentation of
our judicial system." 9o It is not clear why the possibility that Congress
might enact additional techniques for special adjudication of identifiable
bodies of specialized litigation should be a matter for concern. Additional
special courts may or may not be required to cope with future work-
load crises facing the federal judiciary Specific proposals for other
special adjudicatory mechanisms may well be advanced and should be
considered on their merits. However, Congress retains the power to
determine whether any given proposal will be implemented. Its decision
to provide the institutional machinery for special environmental adjudica-
tion would in no way irreversibly commit it to a course of action that
would result in an unduly balkanized judiciary The simple fact is that
the judiciary has functioned acceptably for decades with a system em-
bracing both general and specialized courts, and there is nothing in the
experience of existing special courts which supports the contention that
the effectiveness of our judicial system would be impaired by providing
for specialized adjudication of environmental litigation.
90. Kiechel, supra note 2, at 50015.
